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About a third 
of the Three-City
experimental-group
and comparison-group
movers who first
relocated to very low 
or low-poverty neigh-
borhoods remained in
the same type of neigh-
borhood over time.
Living in high-poverty neighborhoods,
with their high unemployment rates, ram-
pant crime, and struggling schools and
other institutions, can have serious, nega-
tive consequences for the well-being and
life chances of adults and children (see
Ellen and Turner 2003). Distressed inner-
city public housing developments are 
some of the worst, most destructive envi-
ronments for families. Many of these com-
munities are economically isolated and
racially segregated, are overrun with gangs
and drug trafficking, and offer little oppor-
tunity for residents (Popkin, Gwiasda et al.
2000). 
Encouraging findings from Chicago’s
Gautreaux program, a court-ordered racial
desegregation effort that helped public
housing residents move to predominantly
white, mostly suburban communities—an
approach known as “assisted housing
mobility”—suggested that such programs
might be an effective way to help the
inner-city poor. Studies indicated that
Gautreaux adults who moved to the 
suburbs were more likely than their 
counterparts back in the city to be em-
ployed after moving and that children
were more likely to finish high school and
attend four-year colleges (Rubinowitz and
Rosenbaum 2000; Popkin, Buron et al.
2000; DeLuca and Rosenbaum 2002).
However, the successful suburban movers
were a select group, and the Gautreaux
experience highlighted key challenges:
only 19 percent of families that volun-
teered for the program successfully moved,
and some families ended up back in the
inner city (Keels et al. 2005; Turner and
Briggs 2008). We still have much to learn
about how long families need to be ex-
posed to particular neighborhood environ-
ments in order to benefit from them; but
understanding why families sometimes
move back to high-poverty, unsafe areas
after leaving them presents a fundamental
challenge to the effective development of
assisted mobility programs. 
To help understand whether and how
assisted housing mobility programs might
succeed on a larger scale, the U.S. Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) launched the Moving to Oppor-
tunity (MTO) experiment in five metro-
politan areas in 1994. MTO intended to
give families in public and assisted 
housing the chance to move out of high-
crime, high-poverty neighborhoods into
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safer, low-poverty communities.1 The hope
was that beyond being much safer, these
destination areas would offer better hous-
ing, schools, and jobs, which would in turn
improve families’ economic status, health,
and educational outcomes. MTO targeted
families living in some of the nation’s most
distressed public housing in Baltimore,
Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, and New
York. Just over 5,300 very low income fam-
ilies volunteered for MTO in the five cities.
The 4,608 who passed a basic screening
were then randomly assigned to one of
three treatment groups: an experimental
group, a Section 8 comparison group, or a
control group. (See text box on page 11 for
descriptions of the groups.) 
The MTO Interim Impacts Evaluation,
mainly a follow-up survey of the MTO
families at all five sites, was conducted in
2002. Of the 1,820 families assigned to 
the experimental group, just under half 
(47 percent, or 860 families) found a suit-
able apartment and successfully moved to
a neighborhood with less than 10 percent
poverty (according to the 1990 Census).
However, almost half these original 
low-poverty neighborhoods had become
poorer by Census 2000, suggesting that
many MTO families had relocated to
neighborhoods in decline (Orr et al. 2003). 
For instance, 89 percent of experimental-
group families successfully leased up 
in a low-poverty neighborhood (less than
10 percent poverty) based on the 1990
Census.2 Neighborhoods changed so sub-
stantially in those areas that only 39 percent
of the experimental-group families that ini-
tially moved to low-poverty neighborhoods
still had neighborhoods with low poverty
rates by the end of the decade, according to
the 2000 Census. Also, experimental-group
families tended to move to mostly minority
neighborhoods in central cities and inner
suburbs, not racially integrated areas in
more affluent outer suburbs like the neigh-
borhoods of suburban movers who partici-
pated in Gautreaux. 
Many MTO experimental-group fami-
lies moved on after the one-year program-
matic requirement—some to much poorer
areas. Over two-thirds of the experimental-
group and Section 8–comparison families
moved one to three times between leasing
up and 2002. Again, using the 2000 Cen-
sus for both points in time, the share of
experimental-group families living in low-
poverty neighborhoods dwindled—from 
39 percent at the time of the first move to 
25 percent by 2002 (Orr et al. 2003). Even
though MTO families were more successful
than Gautreaux families in moving to low-
poverty neighborhoods, the fact that so
many MTO families left their original 
low-poverty neighborhoods after the first
year and that many of the original desti-
nation neighborhoods grew poorer means 
many MTO experimental families may 
not have had the chance to experience the
full benefits of living in lower-poverty
neighborhoods.
The mostly qualitative Three-City
Study of MTO, a large-scale, mixed-
method study, was designed to examine
key puzzles raised by the interim evalua-
tion, including why experimental-group
families left their low-poverty neighbor-
hoods (see text box on page 11). The Three-
City Study combined a large, stratified
random sample of qualitative interviews,
ethnographic fieldwork on a subsample 
of families, and analysis of census and
administrative data. It was conducted in
three of the five MTO sites: greater Boston,
Los Angeles, and New York. The inter-
views and ethnographic fieldwork took
place in 2004 and 2005, 6 to 10 years after
families’ initial placement through the
MTO program.3
This brief uses the Three-City Study
data to explore the mobility patterns of
MTO experimental-group and Section 8
comparison–group families and the factors
that influenced their moves. 
Where Three-City 
Study Families Lived
When the MTO experimental-group fami-
lies first moved out of public housing, vir-
tually all (90 percent) the experimental
movers4 moved to neighborhoods with
less than 20 percent poverty, and more
than one-third (39 percent) lived in neigh-
borhoods with less than 10 percent
poverty—the targeted MTO neighborhood,
according to the 2000 Census (Orr et al.
2003).5 By the time of the interim evalua-
tion in 2002, 60 percent of the experimental
movers lived in neighborhoods with less
than 20 percent poverty, and 25 percent
lived in neighborhoods with less than 
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10 percent poverty. By 2004, 27 percent of
the Three-City Study experimental-mover
families were living in neighborhoods with
less than 20 percent poverty, and only 
17 percent were living in neighborhoods
with less than 10 percent poverty.6
The interim evaluation found that 
the Section 8 comparison–group mover
families were more likely than experimental-
group families to live in slightly higher-
poverty neighborhoods in 2002. We found
the same patterns in 2004 for the Three-
City Study sample. Almost half the 
Section 8 comparison families lived in
high-poverty neighborhoods, and very 
few (4 percent) lived in low-poverty 
neighborhoods.
Household Mobility: 
Trajectories Over Time
It is one thing to compare report outcomes
by treatment group at one point in time; it
is another to understand where individual
families lived at multiple points in time
during the MTO program. Therefore, we
tracked the Three-City Study’s individual
households’ place of residence at several
points in time with their corresponding
neighborhood poverty rate. We wanted to
know whether families “bounced” repeat-
edly between high- and low-poverty
neighborhoods during the program, or,
once families moved back to a high-
poverty area from a low-poverty area,
whether they stayed in a similar type of
neighborhood over time. 
We relied on MTO administrative data
to track families’ locations at up to five
points in time: their initial relocation move,
1997, 2000, 2002, and 2004 (using our
Three-City Study data).7 Next, we catego-
rized neighborhoods by poverty rate
levels, based on the 2000 Census: very 
low (less than 10 percent poor), low (10 to
20 percent), moderate (20 to 40 percent)
and high poverty (greater than 40 per-
cent).8 Finally, we categorized the neigh-
borhood pattern of each MTO mover
family, calling these patterns neighborhood
trajectories.
Experimental Mover 
Neighborhood Trajectories
About one-third (31 percent) of the Three-
City experimental-mover families that first
relocated to very low or low-poverty
neighborhoods remained in the same type
of neighborhood over time, whether they
moved or not.9 These households had
consistently low-poverty trajectories. Al-
most half (49 percent) the Three-City
experimental-mover families had worsening
neighborhood trajectories; these families
left their first MTO neighborhood rela-
tively quickly and remained in much
poorer areas over time. Only a tiny share
(about 2 percent) of families had incon-
sistent trajectories, moving from a low-
poverty area to a high-poverty area and
then back to a low-poverty area.
Our ethnographic data, which include
systematic observation and informal inter-
viewing over repeat visits with families,
indicated that families with consistently
low-poverty trajectories differed from other
movers in several ways. They seemed to be
luckier, on average, when they first moved,
finding landlords and good-quality hous-
ing units that were more likely to remain
affordable and attractive over time. They
also expressed particularly strong prefer-
ences for “better” areas (defined as safer
and more economically diverse than the
inner city), and they had more limited fam-
ily attachments and obligations in inner-
city areas. In fact, some had even used the
initial relocation to distance or buffer
themselves from needy friends or relatives
with drug addictions, criminal habits, or
other problems.10 It is not surprising, in
that context, that their social lives had
“moved with them”—even, in some 
cases, over multiple moves across a wide
geographic area
These families appeared both satisfied
with and well adapted to their new cir-
cumstances. For instance, Roxanne, an
experimental mover who lost her apart-
ment in a Los Angeles suburb when her
landlord opted to sell the property, found
out about another “good” neighborhood
through a friend. While the new neighbor-
hood was roughly 15 miles away, Roxanne
and her family once again centered their
lives on the new neighborhood.
The reasons that 49 percent of experi-
mental-mover families had worsening
neighborhood trajectories were more var-
ied. First, they were less fortunate in the
rental market at initial lease-up; this may
reflect less successful placement work by
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housing counselors, not just unlucky
choices by families. Many were drawn
back to the inner city because rents priced
them out of more attractive neighborhoods
or because landlords sold their housing
unit or stopped participating in the
Housing Choice Voucher program. The
families then found acceptable units more
readily available in the inner city, even if
they searched in “better” areas as well.
Some families pursued job or training
opportunities in the inner city; if such
options were available in and around low-
poverty areas, the families were unaware
of them. Others moved back primarily
because of social obligations to loved ones.
Sick or otherwise needy family members
loomed large for the most constrained fam-
ilies, whose social lives revolved around
relatives and close friends back in the inner
city even when the families lived in distant,
low-poverty areas. 
Though the ethnographic sample sizes
are small, families in this group also ap-
pear less likely than the consistently low-
poverty trajectory families to have access to
cars. Not having a car was an especially
serious problem for the Los Angeles cases,
some of whom relied on welfare or had
insecure jobs. But it also constrained a 
transit-reliant family living in a poor sec-
tion of Staten Island whose family support
networks were concentrated in the South
Bronx.
There were major site differences in the
frequency of these trajectory types, with
Boston showing much better results over
time than the other two study regions.
Seven in 10 Boston Three-City Study
experimental-group mover families in our
study had consistently low-poverty trajecto-
ries, compared with only 2 in 10 for New
York and 1 in 10 for Los Angeles. These
major differences partly result from dif-
ferences between the metro sites: metro
Boston neighborhoods were much less
likely to have high concentrations of poor
households than metro New York and Los
Angeles, and this remained true over time
as MTO unfolded. For instance, 90 percent
of metro Boston’s neighborhoods had less
than 20 percent poverty, compared with 
67 percent of metro New York’s neigh-
borhoods and 63 percent of metro Los
Angeles’ neighborhoods (for details, see
Kingsley and Pettit 2008). 
Section 8 Mover 
Neighborhood Trajectories
The neighborhood trajectory patterns dif-
fered slightly for Section 8 comparison–
mover families, as they were not required
under MTO to move to low-poverty neigh-
borhoods, nor did they receive special
counseling or search assistance. According
to our neighborhood trajectory analysis,
one-third (33 percent) of the Section 8 sam-
ple first moved to high-poverty neighbor-
hoods and remained there over time. We
characterize these families as having con-
sistently high-poverty neighborhood trajecto-
ries. Another quarter of the Three-City
Section 8–mover families started off in very
low or low-poverty neighborhoods and
remained in these communities over time.
These families had consistently low-poverty
neighborhood trajectories. Just 14 percent
of the Three-City Section 8 movers had
worsening trajectories, where they ended
up in neighborhoods by 2004 that were
poorer than those of their first lease-up;
another 14 percent had improving trajecto-
ries, where they ended up in neighbor-
hoods that had lower poverty rates than
those from where they started.
While the sample sizes are too small 
to come to generalizable conclusions, the
neighborhood trajectory analysis high-
lights an important point: not all MTO
experimental families left their low-
poverty neighborhoods for high-poverty
areas. In fact, approximately one-third of
the experimental-mover families and one-
quarter of the Section 8–comparison fami-
lies were able to stay in low-poverty
neighborhoods through 2004. 
Why MTO Experimental 
Families Moved
Embedded in the trajectory patterns are
two decisions: whether to move at all and,
if so, to what kind of unit and location. For
the first decision, according to the interim
evaluation, the main reasons experimental
families gave for moving after their initial 
lease-up were problems with their lease 
(22 percent), conflicts with the landlord 
(20 percent), and wanting a bigger or 
better-quality apartment (18 percent).
Section 8 comparison–mover families
reported that safety issues (23 percent) and
building issues (13 percent) were their
leading reasons to move (Orr et al. 2003).
For the Three-City Study, we probed
deeper into why families left their initial
unit and why they made any subsequent
moves; we also added direct observational
data to families’ reports. Overall, just over
one-quarter of the Three-City study fami-
lies from the experimental and Section 8
comparison groups discussed wanting a
bigger or better-quality apartment; almost
one-fifth discussed feeling unsafe in their
neighborhood; a little more than one-tenth
reported life changes that necessitated
moves, such as births, sick relatives or
deaths, changing jobs, divorce, or a domes-
tic dispute; and less than one-tenth felt re-
stricted by their landlord, by either a lack
of privacy or rules that were too restrictive
for families with children.11
Section 8 comparison–group movers
were more likely to cite dissatisfaction with
their neighborhood—a lack of safety and
sometimes noise or more generally “the
wrong environment for my children”—as a
main reason for moving. This response was
consistent with the Section 8 comparison
group’s greater exposure to high-poverty
areas and with their lower neighborhood
satisfaction scores.
Experimental-mover families, on the
other hand, were more likely to report dis-
satisfaction with their housing unit or how
the landlord maintained the unit. Sub-
standard physical conditions were a major
culprit. Either the family chose to move
because it was not satisfied with landlord
maintenance and repair, or the unit failed
to meet inspection standards set by the
housing voucher program. Some families
reported health problems related to toxic
home environments, such as carbon mon-
oxide poisoning and mold. During our
study, we observed serious problems first-
hand in some units, such as kitchens over-
run with cockroaches and heat that barely
functioned in the cold winter.
Another prominent reason the Three-
City Study families reported moving was
housing market pressures. Almost one-fifth
of both the Three-City Study experimental-
mover families and Section 8 comparison–
mover families discussed leasing problems
such as units being sold, rented above the
voucher program price ceiling, or removed
from the voucher program altogether as
common reasons for moving. These prob-
lems were unsurprising; during the MTO
experiment, the housing market tightened
substantially, limiting the housing choices
of MTO families and prompting some
involuntary moves.
There were notable differences in why
families moved across the study sites. New
York families talked about market factors—
landlords selling units or raising rents—
prompting them to move twice as often as
Boston or Los Angeles families. These fac-
tors were especially important for mem-
bers of the New York experimental-mover
group, many of whom leased up initially
with small, live-in landlords in multifamily
homes. About one-third of Los Angeles
families from both treatment groups re-
ported that their neighborhoods were unsafe
or undesirable, which prompted them to
move again. Boston MTO families were
more likely to report problems with their
housing unit, either size or quality, as their
motivation to move.
Tightening Housing Markets
Our three study sites had tight housing
markets before MTO began, and these mar-
kets remained significantly tighter and
costlier than the national average over the
course of the MTO demonstration. Some
MTO families, especially in New York,
made what the Census Bureau terms
“involuntary” moves motivated by the
changing housing market. In 1990, the
national vacancy rate was 8.6 percent, com-
pared with 7.9 percent for Boston, 6 per-
cent for Los Angeles, and 4.2 percent for
New York (figure 1).12 By 2000, vacancy
rates had plummeted. Greater Boston, Los
Angeles, and New York were among the
nation’s tightest rental markets, with
vacancy rates of about 3 percent each,
while the national rate was 7 percent.13 By
2004, vacancy rates had eased marginally
in Boston and New York (to 4.2 percent
and 4.9 percent, respectively), while Los
Angeles’ rate had dropped even further, to
2.9 percent. Fair-market rents (FMRs) 
in the sites, which are primarily used to
determine standard payment amounts for
the Housing Choice Voucher program, mir-
ror the vacancy rate trends.14 Our three
sites began and remained very expensive.
Los Angeles’ FMR was $897 for two-
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Many Three-City
MTO families faced
complex choices after
initial relocation—
including difficult
trade-offs among a
decent neighborhood, a
decent apartment, a
job, or reliable free
child care from a loved
one—while negotiating
a tight housing market,
landlords with little
incentive to get or stay
involved with a low-
income housing pro-
gram, and events that
complicate all our
lives.
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bedroom units in 2000 and increased 
33 percent to $1,189 by 2006. Similarly,
Boston’s FMR increased from $1,103 in
2000 to $1,324 by 2006, a 20 percent in-
crease. New York’s FMR increased 7 per-
cent, from $1,061 in 2000 to $1,133 by
2006.15
The monthly share of household in-
come paid for rent—a standard indicator 
of hardship—also increased as the MTO
experiment unfolded. Households that pay
more than 30 percent of their income for
rent are considered to experience housing
hardship. In 2000, 43 percent of all Boston
and New York renters and 46 percent of
Los Angeles renters were over that thresh-
old, compared with the national average of
40 percent.16 By 2004, housing hardship
had jumped a stunning 8 percentage points
for Los Angeles and New York renters and
1 percentage point for renters in Boston.17
Little Room to Maneuver: 
Tough Trade-Offs and Decisions
Many Three-City MTO families faced com-
plex choices after their initial relocation,
including difficult trade-offs among a
decent neighborhood, a decent apartment,
a job, or a reliable source of free child care
from a loved one. Also, as other researchers
have emphasized, looking for decent, safe
housing with a federal rental voucher can
be very challenging, especially in tight,
costly housing markets (Pendall 2000;
Shroder 2002; Pahsup et al. 2005). As we
show above, some MTO families faced
these difficult searches and decisions sev-
eral times between the initial lease-up and
2004, when we visited them.
Most parents in our ethnographic sam-
ple of experimental movers maintained
close ties with family or a small circle of
close friends in high-poverty neighbor-
hoods left behind. Some faced changing
household needs as the makeup of their
households changed. With sick or home-
less relatives moving, or a newborn requir-
ing an additional bedroom, these families
also emphasized as a priority securing a
housing unit with specific features, such 
as number of bedrooms or a yard. There-
fore, these parents weighed the trade-off
between location and housing unit quality
in various ways, especially if they were not
lucky enough, in the initial relocation, to
find a decent unit. In moving on, some had
more bad luck in the housing market, land-
ing in a poorly maintained unit and need-
ing to move on quickly again or ending up
on a block that was more dangerous than it
seemed during the search. Trading away a
decent neighborhood to get a bigger or bet-
ter place was not about preferences in the
FIGURE 1.  Vacancy Rates for Renters in the Three-City Study of MTO Sites
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abstract—indifference to neighborhood
conditions, for example—but was problem-
solving under tight constraints. Lanelle, an
experimental-mover mother in New York,
exemplifies a family that made multiple
moves for different reasons and weighed
difficult making trade-offs at each move
(see sidebar). 
Each decision to move confronted
MTO families with the challenges of find-
ing and leasing up a new unit with the
Housing Choice Voucher—a process that
became more challenging as vacancy rates
dropped in all three metropolitan housing
markets studied. Of those families that
talked specifically about their experiences
using the voucher, more than half felt that
their voucher limited where they could
find viable units, especially in less-poor
neighborhoods.18 Approximately one-
quarter of the families talked about the
challenges of finding a landlord who
would accept vouchers (which include
landlords turning away families with chil-
dren), particularly in better-quality neigh-
borhoods; less than one-quarter of the
families discussed disliking the neighbor-
hoods where many of the units available to
voucher holders were clustered, whether
the neighborhood was too far from family,
too far from work, or too unsafe. A small
number of families talked about the poor
quality of available units and the chal-
lenges in getting apartments to pass the
voucher program inspection.
MTO parents expressed surprise and
relief when landlords in neighborhoods
perceived as much “better” accepted their
vouchers. But sometimes, this called for
extraordinary persistence. Consider
Tameka, an experimental complier in
greater Los Angeles who initially relocated
to a low-poverty neighborhood in the sub-
urbs that she liked very much. When the
landlord stopped accepting housing
vouchers, she was forced to find a new
apartment, and this drove her back to the
central city (and into a higher-poverty
neighborhood), though she looked hard in
the suburbs too. With a great deal of effort,
she found a house in Los Angeles that she
liked, but she had to help the landlord
prepare the unit to pass the required
inspection. 
Families in our study also talked about
their increased reliance on real estate bro-
kers, who had played a significant role in
the initial lease-up at some MTO sites as
housing markets tightened. Families with
limited time, money, transportation, and
other resources for housing search had
ample reason to turn to brokers with reli-
able lists of willing landlords. MTO fami-
lies told us it was better than relying on
outdated lists provided by local public
housing agencies or scanning the classi-
fieds and contacting landlords one by one.
Though MTO offered no formal post-
relocation counseling, brokers acted as de
facto housing counselors, sometimes mak-
ing families’ housing searches more effi-
cient and, at the same time, shaping which
neighborhoods were considered. We are
unable to say, relative to a hypothetical
scenario that does not include brokers,
whether they expanded (in favorable
ways) the range of neighborhoods fami-
lies considered or narrowed that range
(for example, to the areas and landlords
with which the agents were most famil-
iar). Based on prior studies, an unassisted
search by rental voucher holders is usu-
ally a limited search. But the undeniable
lesson is that some MTO families were
Lanelle enjoyed the neighborhood she first moved
to during the MTO program—a low-poverty area in
the Northeast Bronx. She chose the neighborhood
based on a teacher’s recommendation of a strong
elementary school there. But a series of factors
prompted her to move: the heat did not work for 
two weeks in the winter and Lanelle got sick, the
housing authority refused to pay the landlord, and
Lanelle and her children were evicted. After a brief
spell living with her grown son, they found a new
place with a great landlord in a moderately poor
area. But Lanelle’s health problems made the fourth
floor walk-up apartment untenable. Through her
stepfather, Lanelle learned about a good building
near Yankee Stadium in the South Bronx, and sev-
eral relatives moved into the building. Though the
area is poorer and noisier than the Northeast Bronx,
and though no one in the family will walk alone
there at night, it offers many nearby amenities, such
as shopping, the subway, and the youngest daugh-
ter’s school. Lanelle’s family and friends are also
nearby.
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assisted and “steered” by real estate pro-
fessionals long after the program’s initial
intervention. 
How Social Ties and 
Familiar Institutions Matter 
Earlier research on relocation with vouch-
ers has underlined proximity to relatives,
friends, and services as a common priority
in neighborhood choice (Varady 2003), and
research on how families cope in distressed
areas has frequently emphasized the im-
portance of having such social support
near at hand (Venkatesh 2000). These fac-
tors have led some critics of MTO to sug-
gest that families moved back to distressed
neighborhoods, after having escaped such
areas, because of a lack of social support or
feelings of social isolation (e.g., Venkatesh
2000; Garshick Kleit 2001; Greenbaum
2006). In other words, after the one-year
requirement, this line of reasoning sug-
gests that MTO experimental movers
would be eager to move back near social
supports and familiar neighborhood insti-
tutions they left behind. Our data, which
belie that simple story, point to a range of
ways that family and familiarity are con-
sidered when “moving on again.”
Some participants prioritized proxim-
ity to loved ones or cherished institutions,
such as a church. But only about 10 percent
of our interview sample moved back to
inner-city neighborhoods for these reasons,
and most of these families were from Los
Angeles, where families moved much far-
ther on average (in the initial relocation)
and where public transportation is
famously inadequate. There was also the
opposite extreme: families that used
vouchers to distance themselves from
needy or risk-bearing relatives and friends,
including those with a criminal past, no
housing, no steady work, or an addiction
problem. Finally, some families considered
proximity to important social ties (less
often to familiar services) but did not make
it a priority when deciding where to live.
These families appear to have adapted bet-
ter, whether because they had more
resources under their own roofs, economic
opportunities worked out (not necessarily
in the new neighborhood), or for some
other reason. In general, the residential
locations of MTO mover families’ most
important social ties appear much more
important for shaping daily routines
(socializing and commuting patterns, for
example) and neighborhood satisfaction than
either triggering moves or channeling
experimental movers back to inner-city
neighborhoods.
Major Lessons and 
Policy Implications 
Our results, building on the findings from
the MTO Interim Impacts Evaluation,
show that the challenge very low income
families face when they try to stay in low-
poverty neighborhoods, not just get to
them, is not a simple story about preferring
familiar, if distressed, inner-city environ-
ments. Instead, that challenge reflects the
tough decisions that confront these fami-
lies as they juggle preferences that are
often simultaneously unattainable (a big-
ger apartment, stable rent, and/or safer
neighborhood) while negotiating a tight
housing market, landlords who have little
incentive to get or stay involved with a
low-income housing program, and events
that complicate all our lives, such as di-
vorce, job loss, and illness. The less stably
housed the family, the more this was
true—because each new move forced the
family to navigate anew, with little room to
maneuver in the choice of best-possible
neighborhoods. This appears to have con-
tributed to many downward trajectories
that led experimental movers to relocate to
poorer neighborhoods and continue to rent
in that type of neighborhood over time. 
At least in tight markets, a relocation-
only intervention will not be enough. What
the nation needs is a reinvigorated supply-
side strategy, focused on inclusion 
of affordable housing in nondistressed
areas—communities with low crime rates
and, if possible, strong schools and eco-
nomic vitality. Beyond the bricks-and-
mortar element of supply (“hard units”),
the effective supply for the voucher pro-
gram is a function of the enforcement of
unit quality standards and landlord will-
ingness to accept vouchers, which in turn
hinges on effective outreach and respon-
sive payments. It is vital that assisted
relocation not be thought of as simply a
matter of counseling, more generous pay-
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ment levels, or geographic restrictions on
vouchers. 
Wider landlord participation demands
that responsive agencies manage the
voucher program. To ensure the availabil-
ity of landlords in low-poverty neighbor-
hoods, housing agencies need to search on
behalf of families in order to expand fami-
lies’ neighborhood options (as Gautreaux
placement agents did in the program’s first
wave), and then work with landlords to
ensure that decent, leased units will remain
affordable and in compliance as long as
possible. When recipients of housing assis-
tance are unable to remain in their current
units, housing agencies should offer more
relocation counseling. Private rental bro-
kers are already a part of this process, but
there has been little systematic attention to
their role, and how to make the most of it,
in policy debates. 
These improvements need not deny
families the opportunity to lease up where
they want to elsewhere. But, they would
put the onus of the arduous search task in
the most competitive markets on the agen-
cies offering the housing assistance, which
too often fails to live up to national policy
declarations about the importance of a
“suitable living environment” for all Amer-
ican families.
Next is the question of how to miti-
gate difficult trade-offs. Where they had a
meaningful choice to make, some MTO
parents were willing to trade away at-
tractive unit features (including size and
quality) to stay in a better neighborhood.
Others, particularly if they had had to
endure the worst of the dilapidated and
poorly maintained housing stock in the
voucher program, did not make the same
choice. They preferred a better apartment
in a risky environment, and they were
willing to manage the risks. Access to
loved ones also was a factor, especially for
working parents with no good child care
alternatives. 
A key policy implication of this finding
is that “car vouchers” or other transporta-
tion strategies could mitigate the trade-off
between living in a safer neighborhood
and having the desired level of access to
one’s social supports and cherished insti-
tutions. This is one element of what some
have called a next-generation, “mobility
plus” approach that would integrate hard-
won lessons from MTO with important
lessons from other rigorously evaluated
demonstration programs about effective
job supports and family strengthening
services (see Keels et al. 2005; Turner and
Briggs 2008). 
Our policy recommendations suggest
specific ways to make the Housing Choice
Voucher program and complementary
housing policy strategies work more effec-
tively, so families that escape dangerous
and distressed inner-city neighborhoods
can stay out of those areas if they so
choose.
Notes
1. Almost all MTO participants came from public
housing developments: 90 percent came from
public housing and 10 percent from assisted
housing, such as project-based Section 8 build-
ings. Therefore, we use the term “public housing”
to refer to the neighborhoods where families orig-
inally lived.
2. While experimental treatment group families
were required to lease up in census tracts with
less than 10 percent poverty according to the 1990
Census, only 89 percent of the experimental-
mover families met this requirement; 94 percent
of the experimental-group families leased 
up in neighborhoods with less than 11 percent
poverty (Orr et al. 2003). HUD granted a small
number of waivers to experimental-group fami-
lies in special circumstances to move to higher-
poverty neighborhoods, explaining why 6 percent
of the experimental movers leased up in neigh-
borhoods with greater than 11 percent poverty
(Orr et al. 2003).
3. Another research team conducted qualitative
research in the remaining two MTO sites
(Chicago and Baltimore). See, for example,
Clampet-Lundquist and colleagues (2006).
4. We limit this policy brief to experimental-group
and Section 8 comparison–group movers, though
our study also includes nonmovers and control-
group members.
5. The shares of experimental-mover families were
slightly higher using the 1990 Census because
many census tracts grew poorer between 1990
and 2000: 98 percent of the experimental movers
lived in neighborhoods with less than 20 percent
poverty and 89 percent lived in neighborhoods
with less than 10 percent poverty.
6. We intentionally oversampled the number of
experimental movers. Of the 122 households in
the Three-City Study sample, 55 households were
experimental movers and 21 were Section 8
movers. 
7. We included all five points in time that geo-
graphic information was available, even if data
for a family were missing from a particular year.
The data from 1997 and 2000 were from adminis-
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trative canvasses, and many families were
missing data from one of these two years.
For instance, two-thirds of the Section 8
subsample was missing at least one data
point, and 56 percent of the experimental-
mover group was missing the same. 
Still, most families had either 1997 or 2000
data.
8. This one-census approach removes neigh-
borhood change as a source of variation
from the patterns, leaving only residential
mobility.
9. In addition to analyzing the Three-City
Study sample, we analyzed the neighbor-
hood trajectories of the MTO Interim
Impacts Evaluation sample. While the
shares of experimental movers and Sec-
tion 8 comparison movers from the in-
terim evaluation differed slightly from the
Three-City study sample, the patterns
were the same.
10. We caution that these distinctions are
based on the ethnographic sample of 
28 experimental compliers, which in-
cluded an oversample of those who were
living in suburban areas.
11. In our analysis, we included all reasons for
why households moved; we did not report
a main or prominent reason. 
12. Data are from the 1990 U.S. Census. The
vacancy rates are for the county containing
the central city.
13. Data are from the 2006 American
Community Survey.
14. HUD annually estimates fair-market rents
for metropolitan and nonmetropolitan
areas. The FMR is set at the 40th percentile
rent of standard quality units, indicating
that 40 percent of housing rented for less
than the FMR. The FMR data discussed in
this brief are for two-bedroom units. The
geographies are FMR HUD areas, which
are similar to the three sites’ metropolitan
areas. These FMRs are inflation-adjusted to
2006 dollars. 
15. FMR data are from the “FMR HUD
History 1983–2006,” HUD User web site. 
16. Data are from the 2000 U.S. Census. The
housing hardship data are for the county
containing the central city.
17. Data are from the 2004 American
Community Survey.
18. Fifty-four families talked about their
experiences using their vouchers, or 
44 percent of the Three-City Study 
household sample. Thirty-one families
identified problems using their vouchers
in affluent neighborhoods.
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The Moving to Opportunity Demonstration
In 1994, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) launched the Moving
to Opportunity Demonstration (MTO) in 1994 in five metropolitan areas: Baltimore, Boston,
Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York. MTO was a voluntary relocation program for very low
income residents of public and assisted housing located in high-poverty neighborhoods in
these cities. Those who volunteered were randomly assigned to one of three treatment
groups: a control group (families retained their public housing unit, but received no new assis-
tance); a Section 8 comparison group (families received the standard counseling and a voucher
subsidy for use in the private housing market); or an experimental group. The experimental
group families received special relocation counseling (focused on opportunities to live in 
low-poverty areas) and search assistance. They also received a voucher usable only in a low-
poverty neighborhood (less than 10 percent poor as of the 1990 Census), with the requirement
that the family live there for at least one year. 
Of the 1,820 families assigned to the experimental group, just under half (48 percent, or 860)
found a willing landlord with a suitable rental unit and moved successfully or “leased up”; they
were experimental “complier” families. The MTO Interim Impacts Evaluation—conducted in
2002, approximately five to seven years after families relocated—found that many experi-
mental group families had moved again, some of them several times—and many moved out 
of their low-poverty neighborhoods. In addition, about 70 percent of the control group had
moved out of public housing, mostly to other poor urban neighborhoods. Families in the MTO
experimental group, however, were still much more likely to be living in low-poverty areas
(whether the original placement areas or other areas) than their Section 8 voucher or control
family counterparts. MTO families also had lived for longer periods in such areas than families
in the other two groups. 
The Three-City Study of MTO 
The Three-City Study of MTO is a large-scale, mixed-method study focused on three MTO
sites: Boston, Los Angeles, and New York. The study was designed to examine key puzzles
that emerged in previous MTO research, including the Interim Evaluation, and combines analy-
sis of MTO survey, census, and neighborhood indicator data with new, qualitative data collec-
tion. The family-level data were collected in 2004 and 2005—about 6 to 10 years after families’
initial placement through the MTO program and 2 years after the Interim Evaluation data collec-
tion. First, we randomly selected 122 families, conducting 276 semistructured, in-depth quali-
tative interviews with parents, adolescents, and young adults in all three treatment groups. 
We included compliers (those who successfully moved at the outset) and noncompliers (those
who did not move through the program) in the experimental and comparison groups, although
we weighted compliers more heavily. Overall, we conducted 81 interviews in Boston, 120 in
Los Angeles, and 75 in New York. The combined cooperation rate (consents as a share of eligi-
ble households contacted) was 80 percent. Next, we launched “family-focused” ethnographic
fieldwork, visiting a subset of 39 control group and experimental-complier families repeatedly
over six to eight months. The cooperation rate for the ethnographic subsample was 70 percent.
The Three-City Study of MTO is housed at the Urban Institute. The principal investigators are
Xavier de Souza Briggs of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Susan Popkin of the
Urban Institute, and John Goering of the City University of New York. The study is funded by
the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Annie E. Casey, Fannie Mae,
Rockefeller, Smith-Richardson, and William T. Grant Foundations.
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